By: Kathleen Maginnis
Photo Credit: Lloyd Wakefield, @lloyddddddddddddddddd // Instagram
I. Introduction
In Harry Styles’ long-awaited January 2026 single “Aperture,” he chants the lyrics “we belong together” twelve times throughout the electronic synth ballad.[1] Announcing a tour shortly after the song’s release, aptly dubbed the “Together, Together Tour,” Styles’ marketing strategy promoted the idea of closeness and harmony between him and attendees.[2] Considering Styles’ last tour spanned 22 months, 169 shows, and 7 legs, fans were prepared to join the Grammy-winner for a lengthy, intensive, and international tour.[3]
Instead, and somewhat surprisingly, Styles elected for residencies in a handful of international major cities.[4] His only stop in the United States will be a 30-night stint at Madison Square Garden in New York City.[5] Residency-style tours have become increasingly popular for artists, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic.[6] In fact, after the pandemic, Styles was one of the first artists to choose residency dates instead of one-stop nights.[7] This strategy helped mitigate the risks of spreading the virus amongst a large band and crew. Now, even without the need for virus mitigation, residency touring is common on a much larger scale.[8]
II. Residency Tours versus Traditional Models
Residency tours are profitable for artists “of high enough caliber,”[9] who rely on their fanbases to travel to concerts. In turn, the local economies of the residencies are boosted with hordes of fans visiting the cities, perhaps even staying for multiple nights, contributing to the local markets through lodging, food and drink, or other purchases.[10] Love on Tour, Styles’ previous tour, was a regional residency with fewer shows in five North American cities.[11] Together, Together, however, is only booked for Madison Square Garden.[12] While beneficial for artists and chosen cities, residency tours continue to harm fans due to rising costs across the American economy.[13]
Costs alone are not the only problem with residency touring.[14] It is becoming increasingly clear that residency touring is inherently preclusive. Residencies often neglect fans who are not local to the chosen venue or are unable to travel to a show. Those who would have gone to see Harry Styles now are sidelined, with would-have-been-revenue sitting in their pockets.[15] Electing for a Madison Square Garden residency is a near-sighted choice for Styles and his team, and one that is especially misaligned with Together, Together’s branding of connection and closeness.[16]
When disappointed by a performer, fans tend to place blame on the artist and their teams.[17] This instinct makes sense, as tour marketing, locations of shows, and choice of venue are all visible choices made by the performer.[18] However, that blame is misdirected. The consumer harm of residency touring is not solely due to venue exclusivity. Instead, an anticompetitive market that controls access to tickets exponentially magnifies the consumers’ injury.
III. The Ticketmaster Monopoly
In an intentionally scarce market, artists and fans alike are forced to operate under damaging constraints imposed by vertically integrated corporate intermediaries like Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster does not merely sell tickets; it functions as the primary controller between fans and live entertainment. For Styles’ tour, and many others, purchasing through Ticketmaster is not one option amongst others; it is the only option.[19] In economics, this monopoly creates inelastic pricing since there is no substitute good to create pricing competition.[20] This price is solely controlled by Ticketmaster and is intentionally set artificially high.[21]
Fans register for pre-sales, organized by the conglomerate,[22] or wait for general admission, but cannot meaningfully explore other purchase options until tickets are purchased and then potentially put back on the resale market (which is another issue in itself).[23] For fans who want to participate in the primary ticketing market, it is Ticketmaster or bust.[24]
This dominance is the direct and predictable result of a publicly traded corporate structure that prioritizes shareholder value and profit-maximization, even if it harms consumers.[25] In the primary market for tickets to major events and concerts, Ticketmaster functions as a monopoly because consumers lack meaningful alternatives for obtaining tickets to high-demand shows at large venues.[26] “A monopoly is when a single company or entity creates an unreasonable restraint of competition in a market.”[27] Legally, the term monopoly also describes a variety of market conditions.[28] “For instance, the term monopoly may be referring to instances where: [t]here are many buyers or sellers, but one actor has enough market share to dictate prices.”[29]
Ticketmaster currently controls over 70% of the primary ticketing market, giving it incredible power to control pricing, venue choice, and even the mechanics of fan buying power.[30] Through a dynamic- or surge-pricing model, Ticketmaster can increase ticket prices in real time based on demand during live sales.[31] During Styles’ most recent Madison Square Garden pre-sales, prices for individual tickets reportedly spiked to well over $1,000 after being listed for less than $280.[32]
Ticketmaster’s market power and the consumer harm it produces are not new discoveries based solely on Styles’ tour announcement. In 2010, Ticketmaster merged with Live Nation, one of the top concert promotion companies in the country, “to form an entertainment colossus that handles ticket services, artist management, concert promotion, and venue ownership.”[33] Before the unification, the Department of Justice challenged the merger and only approved the event subject to a multitude of anticompetitive conditions.[34] Yet the increasingly negative consumer experience today suggests that these conditions have failed to mitigate the anticompetitive effects. If prior attempts to remedy the situation have failed to restore the primary market, meaningful reform must turn to legal tools to dismantle this monopoly power.
Live Nation and Ticketmaster must be separated. In May 2024, the Department of Justice and thirty state attorneys filed an antitrust lawsuit against the company after over two years of probing.[35] ABC News reported:
The Justice Department’s lawsuit accuses Live Nation of seeking to lock out competitors to protect what the company dubs its “flywheel,” described in court documents as “a self-reinforcing business model that captures fees and revenue from concert fans and sponsorship, uses that revenue to lock up artists to exclusive promotion deals, and then uses its powerful cache of live content to sign venues into long-term exclusive ticketing deals, thereby starting the cycle all over again.”[36]
This case is still moving towards a jury trial, without a set date. While consumers wait for the verdict, there is plenty of opportunity to use corporate law to drive change.
IV. Corporate Law as a Driver for Change
Antitrust litigation alone is unlikely to resolve the deeper structural failures that allowed the monopoly to develop in the first place. The “flywheel,” as described by the Department of Justice, is not only the product of monopolistic conduct but also the result of corporate consolidation permitted and defended by the legal architecture. The Federal Trade Commission also sued Live Nation, with the Break Up Ticketmaster Coalition stating, “[t]heir complaint demonstrates that Live Nation–Ticketmaster’s vertical monopoly doesn’t just fleece fans with sky-high fees and exclusive deals; it encourages and profits from the chaos that lawbreaking brokers create.”[37]
The monopoly is not a singular outlier but instead is a logical outcome of corporate law’s tolerance for vertical consolidation without reliable structural constraints.[38] Until companies are barred, or at least discouragedfrom taking full control of their supply chain processes through legal consequences, consumers will continue to be harmed. Capable companies would likely aim to follow the Live Nation and Ticketmaster model, as their merger and integration have unfortunately shown that monopolies are permitted to exist with little regulatory oversight. When policy regulates behavior without altering harmful structures, monopoly power becomes embedded in the system. Meaningful and legal, reform of the Ticketmaster monopoly must directly confront the structures that transformed live performance into capital markets.
V. Conclusion
What began as fan outrage over Harry Styles’ residency tour reveals a deeper structural problem with how fans access live music. The frustration is not just about a choice of residence or exceedingly high demand; it is the direct result of a dangerous monopoly. While the Department of Justice’s ongoing suit signals impending remedies, litigation alone cannot change a market that is built on the consolidation of controlling companies. The deeper failure lies with corporate law and the institutions that permitted vertical integration. Until various legal actions end Ticketmaster’s dominance, Styles’ claims of “Together, Together” will remain nothing more than branding rhetoric, while fans continue to bear the costs of a monopolistic system.
About The Author
Kathleen Maginnis is a second-year law student at Widener University Delaware Law School and a Staff and Essay Editor on the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. She is specifically interested in the intersection of corporate, sports, and entertainment law, with a focus on brand management and compliance. She graduated from Saint Joseph’s University, where she earned both her Master of Business Administration and Bachelor of Business Administration degrees. Outside of law school, she enjoys watching Philadelphia sports, spending time with friends, and long walks with her dog, Moose.
[1] Harry Styles, Aperture, on Kiss All The Time. Disco, Occasionally. [Single] (Sony Jan. 22, 2026).
[2] Image posted by HSHQ (@hshq), Instagram, HSHQ chief news analyst Steve Kornacki (@steve01450) takes to the board to break down Harry Styles: Together, Together (Jan. 22, 2026), https://www.instagram.com/p/DT0hlgcEZ5u/ (on file with the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law) [hereinafter “Tour Announcement”].
[3] Love on Tour, Harry Styles Fandom, https://harrystyles.fandom.com/wiki/Love_on_Tour (last visited Feb. 10, 2026).
[4] Tour Announcement, supra note 2.
[5] Id.
[6] Sophia Olson, To Tour or Not to Tour? The Case for Residencies, Gen Admission (Jan. 29, 2025), https://www.genadmission.org/articles/to-tour-or-not-to-tour-the-case-for-residencies.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Sarah Kopit, Music Residencies Are Big Money for Live Tourism — and Every City Wants in, Skift, https://skift.com/es/2025/12/09/music-residencies-are-big-money-for-live-tourism-and-every-city-wants-in/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2026); see also Isabela Raygoza, How Bad Bunny’s Historic Puerto Rico Residency Will Boost the Island’s Economy and Image, Billboard (July 7, 2025), https://www.billboard.com/pro/bad-bunny-puerto-rico-residency-help-local-economy/#:~:text=Preparing%20for%20the%20residency%20presents,slow%20season%20to%20Puerto%20Rico.%E2%80%9D.
[11] Alex Young, Harry Styles to Play Multi-Date Residencies in New York, Los Angeles, and More, Consequence (May 5, 2022), https://consequence.net/2022/05/harry-styles-harrys-house-tour-dates/.
[12] Tour Announcement, supra note 2.
[13] Robert Levine, Concert Residencies in Big Cities are Here to Stay. That’s Great for Artists – What About Fans?, Billboard (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.billboard.com/pro/artists-ditching-tours-residencies-touring-economics/.
[14] Id.
[15] Erin, The Rise of the Digital Front Row: Livestream Concerts, Tradable Bits (Oct. 6, 2025), https://blog.tradablebits.com/the-digital-front-row-livestream-concerts.
[16] Together, Together Tour 2026, H.S., https://www.hstyles.co.uk/tour/.
[17] Ayana Archie, So You’re Buying Tickets for Harry Styles’ Tour. Can Artists Control the Prices?, NPR (Jan. 28, 2026), https://www.npr.org/2026/01/28/nx-s1-5686667/harry-styles-presale-tickets; see also Sofia Chierchio, Harry Styles Ticket Prices Spark Outrage Among Fans, Forbes (Jan. 27, 2026), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sofiachierchio/2026/01/27/harry-styleTicketmaster solely controls this prices-ticket-prices-spark-outrage-among-fans/.
[18] Archie, supra note 17.
[19] Together, Together Tour 2026, supra note 16.
[20] Ali Hussain, What Is Inelastic? Definition, Calculation, and Examples of Goods, Investopedia (Jun. 19, 2025), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/inelastic.asp.
[21] Isaias Jaramillio Rojas, Ticketmaster’s Dynamic Pricing: What It Is and How It Works, PriceFX (Aug. 2, 2023), https://www.pricefx.com/learning-center/ticketmasters-dynamic-pricing-what-it-is-and-how-it-works.
[22] How Do Presales Work?, Ticketmaster, https://help.ticketmaster.com/hc/en-us/articles/9702132309905-How-do-presales-work.
[23] See Dhruvi Dedhia, Scalping the System: The Ticket Resale Market, Mich. J. of Econ. (last visited Feb. 11, 2026), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2025/01/08/scalping-the-system-the-ticket-resale-market/.
[24] Adam Hayes, Ticketmaster Monopoly: Analyzing Its Market Dominance and Criticisms, Investopedia (Nov. 18, 2026), https://www.investopedia.com/is-ticketmaster-a-monopoly-6834539.
[25] Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (LYV), Yahoo! Finance (last visited Feb. 10, 2026), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/LYV/.
[26] Hayes, supra note 24.
[27] Monopoly, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/monopoly.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Hayes, supra note 24.
[31] Jaramillio Rojas, supra note 21.
[32] Madison Kemeny, Where to Find Harry Styles’ NYC Residency Tickets as Low as $280, Syracuse.com (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.syracuse.com/live-entertainment/2026/02/harry-styles-soldout-nyc-residency-still-has-tickets-as-low-as-280-but-prices-are-rising.html.
[33] Samantha Gastelum, The Ticketmaster and Live Nation Merger: Why They Should Have Never Ever Been Together, 65 B.C. L. Rev. 205 (2024), https://bclawreview.bc.edu/articles/3106.
[34] Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, The Ticketmaster/Live Nation Merger Review and Consent Decree in Perspective (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/speech/ticketmasterlive-nation-merger-review-and-consent-decree-perspective.
[35] Alexander Mallin, Justice Department Seeks Breakup of Live Nation–Ticketmaster Through Major Antitrust Suit, ABC News (May 23, 2024), https://abcnews.com/US/justice-department-30-states-live-nation-ticketmaster-antitrust-lawsuit/story?id=110501830#:~:text=Ticketmaster%2C%20which%20controls%20more%20than%2070%25%20of,seeking%20higher%2Dpriced%20tickets%20on%20the%20secondary%20market.
[36] Id.
[37] Press Release, Am. Econ. Liberties Project, Break Up Ticketmaster Coalition Welcomes FTC Suit Against Monopoly’s Deceptive Pricing Tactics, Urges Admin to Move Forward with a Breakup (Sep. 24, 2025), https://www.economicliberties.us/press-release/break-up-ticketmaster-coalition-welcomes-ftc-suit-against-monopolys-deceptive-pricing-tactics-urges-admin-to-move-forward-with-a-break-up/.
[38] Id.
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