By: Dillon DiCiurcio

Introduction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is a powerful tool that allows parties to be relieved from a final judgment or order.[1]  Rule 60(c)(1) requires Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) motions for relief for mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, to be brought within one year after entry of the final judgment or order.[2]  However, a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which provides relief from a final judgment based on voidness, must be made within a “reasonable time”.[3]  Historically, federal courts have not applied the “reasonable time” requirement to motions alleging voidness under Rule 60(b)(4).  This has effectively allowed litigants to seek 60(b)(4) relief at any time.[4]  The reason being that, as a matter of law, void judgments are legal nullities and have no binding effect.[5]  In January 2026, the Supreme Court in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, clarified the reasonable time requirement to bring a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, after an adversary proceeding was commenced in connection with a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.  This discussion focuses on the Court’s holding in Coney Island and the events that lead to the Court’s decision.

The Bankruptcy Case

      In January 2014, Vista-Pro Automative LLC (“Vista Pro”), filed its bankruptcy petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.[6]  Shortly thereafter, Vista Pro initiated an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (“Coney Island”), to collect $50,000 in unpaid invoices.[7]  Vista Pro attempted to effectuate service of the complaint on Coney Island by mail.[8]

According to Coney Island, they never received notice of the adversary proceeding, and Vista Pro failed to comply with service by mail requirements under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3).[9] Allegedly, because of Vista Pro’s failure to adequately notify Coney Island, Coney Island never answered the complaint, leaving them vulnerable to a default judgment.[10]  And that’s exactly what happened.  In 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judgment against Coney Island.[11]  Over the next six years, the Bankruptcy trustee made substantial efforts to enforce the default judgment.[12]   Finally, in 2021, the trustee succeeded and funds were seized from Coney Island’s bank account to satisfy the default judgment.[13]  Coney Island moved to vacate the default judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4), alleging Vista Pro’s failure to properly serve them in compliance with local bankruptcy rules.[14]  In support of its motion, Coney Island argued the seizure was the first time they were notified of Vista Pro’s claims against them and the default judgment.[15]

Procedural Posture

      The Bankruptcy Court denied Coney Island’s 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the default judgment.[16]  The Bankruptcy Court explained that moving to vacate a default judgment, six years after the judgment was entered, was not within a reasonable time required under Rule 60(c)(1).[17]  Coney Island appealed to the District Court, and thereafter to the Third Circuit, which both affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s denial.[18]  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Coney Island argued the reasonable time period under Rule 60(c)(1) does not apply to Rule 60(b)(4) motions alleging voidness.[19] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable time requirement applies to voidness motions under Rule 60(b)(4).

Must Motions Made Under Rule 60(b)(4) Be Within a “Reasonable Time?”

      Ultimately, the Court holds that the reasonable time requirement under Rule 60(c)(1) applies to all Rule 60(b) motions for relief, including motions seeking relief for voidness under Rule 60(b)(4).[20]  The Court begins its analysis by referring to the exact language of Rule 60(c)(1).[21]  The plain reading and interpretation of Rule 60(c)(1) requires Rule 60(b)(4) motions to be made within a reasonable time.[22]  It is not an ambiguous rule. If the rule considered anything other than a reasonable time for 60(b)(4) motions, it would expressly provide for an exact time.[23]  For example, Rule 60(c)(1) expressly proclaims a year one period after entry of the final judgment for motions seeking relief for fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.[24]

Though the plain reading of Rule 60(c)(1) unequivocally states that all Rule 60(b) motions must be brought within a reasonable time, federal courts are split on whether the reasonable time requirement applies to Rule 60(b)(4) motions.[25]  Courts that do not apply the reasonable time period to 60(b)(4) motions recognize their interpretation conflicts with the exact language of Rule 60(c)(1).[26]  However, these courts believe that void judgments are “legal nullities”.[27]  And since these judgments are void from the inception of the case, they have no legal force or binding effect.  Thus, in the eyes of these courts, there should be no time limitation to challenge a final judgment or order that is truly void as a matter of law. 

The Court ultimately rejects this interpretation.[28]  Litigants would need to refer to a legal principle, such as Due Process, for example, that gives them a right to allege voidness at any time.[29]   In fact, the Court notes that most statues impose time limitations on when parties can challenge legal errors.[30]   The Court also questions Coney Island’s argument that precedent allows parties to challenge voidness at any time, explaining that the “historical record” is unclear.[31]  There is no consensus; some courts allow parties to allege voidness at any time, and others do not.[32] In addition, the text of Rule 60(c)(1) is clear, which supersedes any contrary precedent or any other federal court decision.[33]

Conclusion

      The Supreme Court’s decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton resolves a longstanding split among circuit courts.  The reasonable time requirement under Rule 60(c)(1) applies to all Rule 60(b) motions, including 60(b)(4) motions alleging voidness.  As illustrated in Coney Island, issues involving ineffective service are common in bankruptcy proceedings.  Federal practitioners must act swiftly when challenging a judgment as void for ineffective service, or on other grounds.  Another question that the Supreme Court failed to address is what constitutes a “reasonable time” to bring a 60(b)(4) motion.  Federal courts will be tasked with answering this question in future litigation. 

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[1] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

[2] Id. (c)(1).

[3] Id.

[4] See, e.g., Harris v. Harde-man, 55 U.S. 334, 339, 344–46 (1852).

[5] Coney Island Auto Parts, Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, No. 24–808, slip op. at *3 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).  

[6] See id. at *2. The case was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7. 

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] See Fed. Bankr. R. P. 7004(b)(3) (requiring service by mail upon a corporation to include a summons and complaint addressed to an officer, agent, and the defendant, if authorized by statue or law).

[10] Coney Island, slip op. at 2.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. 

[14] Coney Island, slip op. at 2.

[15] The Court does mention that the trustee sent a letter to Coney Island’s CEO, informing him of the default judgment. Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Coney Island, slip op. at 2.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 4.

[21] Id. at 3.

[22] Coney Island, slip op. at 3.

[23] Id.

[24] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

[25] Coney Island, slip op. at 3.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Coney Island, slip op. at 3.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Coney Island, slip op. at 3.