By: Anthony Mineo
Delaware has a unique history regarding sports betting, as the First State became the second tate to legalize in-person sports betting in 2009.[1] However, Delaware’s first foray into the sports betting business began in 1976 with “Scoreboard,” a series of NFL lottery games with three different variants that allowed players to bet on specific aspects of the games to be played that week.[2] The NFL and all its teams sued the Governor of Delaware and others for the release of the lottery game, alleging the games misappropriated their intellectual property and constituted “a forced association with gambling.”[3] The Delaware District Court ordered that the games include materials that Scoreboard is not associated with or authorized by the NFL but still allowed the games to be in circulation.[4]
While Scoreboard’s history isn’t well known, it is important to recognize that these lottery games put Delaware in a unique position. When the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) was enacted, the law prohibited states from operating any gambling on “competitive sporting events.”[5] PASPA allowed states that already had commissioned sports betting to continue under a grandfathering clause, which allowed states like Delaware to roll out lottery games and allow in-person sports betting before PASPA was repealed by the Supreme Court.[6]
Less than a month after the repeal of the PASPA, Delaware made headlines when, on June 5, 2018, the state legalized full-scale sports betting with Governor Jack Carney placing a $10 winning bet on the Phillies that night.[7] Then, Delaware joined twenty-nine states in January 2024 by incorporating mobile betting into its state lottery program.[8] Since Delaware’s mobile betting market is run by the state, they were able to contract the rights to Rush Street Interactive (RSI), the owners of BetRivers, as the sole mobile betting operator within the state until 2029, with an option to renew the contract yearly until 2034.[9]
However, it did not take long for state representatives to introduce legislation to allow multiple sports betting vendors to operate in the First State, effectively invalidating the exclusivity of RSI’s agreement with the state. [10] The interest in removing exclusivity does raise some legal concerns, as Delaware House Minority Leader Mike Ramone stated, “The way everybody loses is when we end up in court[…] I’m just stating, if I were the owner and this went through, in any format without my involvement or cooperation, [the state] gets sued, not [the other vendors].”[11] Conversely, there is undeniable demand for other vendors; in March 2024, a FanDuel representative stated that there were 600,000 login attempts to the FanDuel sports betting app in Delaware.[12]
Online discourse on this issue is rampant as well. On Delawarean subreddits, there are continuous discussions about how to get past the restriction against third-party sports betting apps: “Del[ware] only allows one app (BetRivers). So if you want to use something else you have to leave the state.”[13] It is no secret that it is common for Delawareans to drive into another state to place their bets, given Delaware’s small geographic size.[14] Additionally, Delawareans who are using BetRivers are citing consistent issues with their use of the app: “The app [BetRivers] constantly crashes on me.”[15] “Honestly, [Delaware] should only allow people with gambling problems to use [BetRivers]. They would kick the habit out of sheer frustration. I swear it’s bad on purpose.”[16]
If Delaware were to push forward a bill to allow for multiple sports betting vendors to operate in the state, as pointed out by House Minority Leader Ramone, the state would be sued for damages. Under Delaware Law, plaintiffs must prove the damages caused by the defendant’s breach of the contract.[17] Regarding the remedy to be applied, “the standard remedy for breach of contract ‘is based upon the reasonable expectations of the parties ex ante.’”[18]
Given this standard, it would be likely that BetRivers would try to recover lost profits as a result of Delaware’s breach if the state were to allow for multiple vendors. The Court of Chancery has ruled that in the scope of non-compete agreements, “lost profits from business[es] within the scope of the parties’ non-compete are direct, not consequential damages.”[19] This distinction is important as Delaware requires that a plaintiff show that consequential damages are foreseeable at the time of contracting.[20] Further, “Under Delaware law, consequential damages in the form of good will, lost future profits, and lost customers are not awarded in breach of contract actions.”[21] Additionally, once an injured party has proven damages, there is less certainty required for establishing the amount of damages, negating the need for the plaintiff to establish the amount of damages with a precise certainty.[22]
Given the rules stated previously, it would be easy to speculate how BetRivers could establish lost-profit damages, as it could point to the revenue generated by the third-party vendors. Though a precise number would not be needed, given that the state lottery [23]revenue from mobile betting, it would be easy to calculate their lost profits. Either way, Delaware’s state lottery contracted themselves into a tough position as their gambling market is not thrilled with their sole option, and if they were to allow additional vendors to operate, the state would risk losing revenue from allowing additional vendors.
Lastly, many Delawareans can access the increasingly popular Prediction Market apps, which are allowed by allowing US citizens to trade derivatives based on Event contracts. [24] These markets are regulated by the Commodity and Future Trading Commission (CFTC).[25] Delaware does not make much revenue from Delawareans engaging in the predictive market, as Delaware has a gaming tax rate of 50% and a Corporate tax rate of 8.70%.[26] According to a graph created by Forbes, this means that Delaware would make 574.71% more in tax revenue if a resident placed a sports bet on BetRivers instead of a predictive market app like Kalshi.[27]
As of now, Delaware’s gaming market is in a grey area due to both the monopoly BetRivers holds in the state and the rise of predictive market betting. With the current contract the state has with RSI, it will likely be this way until at least 2029, if RSI chooses not to renew the contract.[28] The First State is no longer the frontrunner in the gaming market that it once was due to these recent developments. The state will likely continue to lose money due to Delawareans opting to drive to a bordering state to place bets and the growth of predictive markets.[29]
[1] Michelle Kaske, Let the Betting Begin, The Bond Buyer (May 18, 2009), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/let-the-betting-begin.
[2] Natl. Football League v. Gov. of State of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Del. 1977).
[3] Id.
[4] Id., at 1390–91.
[5] Murphy v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U.S. 453, 461 (2018).
[6] Id. at 462, 474.
[7] Camila Domonoske, Delaware Legalizes Sports Gambling, And Governor Makes First Bet, NPR (June 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617483008/delaware-legalizes-sports-gambling-and-governor-makes-first-bet.
[8] Jacob Owens, Mobile Sport Betting Launches in Delaware, Del. Bus. Times (Jan. 2, 2024), https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/mobile-sports-betting-launches-in-delaware/.
[9] Id.
[10] Sarah Petrowich, Delaware Looks to Allow Multiple Sports Betting Apps, Questions of Revenue Loss and Lawsuits Ensue, Del. Public Media (May 26, 2024), https://www.delawarepublic.org/culture-lifestyle-sports/2024-05-26/delaware-sports-betting-apps-questions.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] u/Packtasticcheese, Reddit (Nov. 3, 2025), https://www.reddit.com/r/MiddletownDE/comments/1omyu5e/comment/nmt3ler/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button.
[14] Owens, supra note 8.
[15] u/TaszleDiesel, Reddit (Dec. 13, 2025), https://www.reddit.com/r/sportsbetting/comments/1plz0k4/comment/ntw5xwo/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button.
[16] u/ghostboi420, Reddit (Dec. 14, 2025), https://www.reddit.com/r/sportsbetting/comments/1plz0k4/comment/ntzjrnc/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button.
[17] Gener8, LLC v. Castanon, No. 2022-0426-LWW, 2023 WL 6381635, at *27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2023), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2023)
[18] Id. at *31 (quoting Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2001)).
[19] Base Optics Inc. v. Liu, No. CV 9803-VCG, 2015 WL 3491495, at *16 n. 122 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2015)
[20] In re Dura Medic Holdings, Inc. Consol. Litig.,333 A.3d 227, 261 (Del. Ch. 2025)
[21] Crowell Corp. v. Himont USA, Inc., 1994 WL 762663 at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 1994), see also JanCo FS 2, LLC v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 344 A.3d 1009, 1039 (Del. Super. Ct. 2025).
[22] Siga Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc.,132 A.3d 1108, 1131 (Del. 2015), as corrected (Dec. 28, 2015).
[23] Owens, supra note 8.
[24] Bloomberg Originals, How Prediction Markets Turned the World into a Casino, YouTube (Apr. 10, 2026) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPriy8Iy040&t=17s.
[25] Id.
[26] Nathan Goldman, Prediction Markets Are Costing States Millions in Tax Revenue, Forbes (Mar. 9, 2026) https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathangoldman/2026/03/09/prediction-markets-are-costing-states-millions-in-tax-revenue/.
[27] Id.
[28] Owens, supra note 8.
[29] Id.; Goldman, supra note 26.
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