By: Nick Johnston

Introduction
“[The Protect College Sports Act] is about reigning in the bad practices that are happening in college sports today, the runaway costs… [and] the runaway arms race in sports spending.”[1]
The Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston, authorizing compensation for collegiate student athletes, was deliberately narrow. The Court recognized that the national debate over amateurism in college sports raises significant policy questions.[2] Yet, the Supreme Court Justices made clear that resolving those broader issues lies beyond the judiciary’s proper role.[3] As appellate judges, the bench’s sole task was to examine the lower courts’ judgment under settled antitrust law.[4] It neither settled the larger controversy over amateurism nor expanded judicial authority into legislative territory. That holding left the NCAA exposed. What followed was predictable: a wave of antitrust and related challenges targeting not only compensation rules but also the Association’s core eligibility framework, especially the five-year rule limiting intercollegiate competition to four seasons within five calendar years of initial enrollment.[5]
The result, as detailed in previous analysis of cases involving Diego Pavia, Joey Aguilar, and Trinidad Chambliss, has been fragmented and has inconsistent outcomes.[6] Federal and state courts have issued conflicting rulings, including (1) preliminary injunctions that never reach the merits on whether junior-college seasons count against the eligibility clock, (2) the denial of medical hardship waivers, and (3) awarding athletes relief as third-party beneficiaries under contracts between the NCAA and its members.[7] The same collegiate conference (the SEC) has seen one player cleared via federal injunction under antitrust law, another denied in state court under similar facts, and a third’s state supreme court appeal granted over implied contractual duties.[8] Eligibility has become a function of forum selection, timing pressure from calendar deadlines, and which plaintiff can present the most persuasive argument for temporary relief.[9] As a result, competitive balance within conferences suffers and young athletes face profound uncertainty when making high-stakes decisions.
The Protect College Sports Act of 2026 (the “Act”) is Congress’s direct response to this post-Alston disorder. Passed by the Senate 77-22 in September and now awaiting House consideration, the bipartisan measure seeks to replace judicial improvisation with uniform federal standards and limited antitrust protection.[10] If passed, the law will preempt the patchwork of state anti-trust laws and judicial decisions that have destabilized college sports with a universal set of rules.[11]
Codifying Clear Eligibility Rules
Section 113 of the Act establishes baseline eligibility standards for collegiate sports.[12] Under the Act, student-athletes will generally receive a five-year eligibility window, typically beginning with the academic year following high-school graduation, the athlete’s 19th birthday, or initial full-time enrollment; whichever comes first.[13] The clock can be tolled only for specified reasons such as pregnancy, religious missions, active-duty military service, or other uniformly applied exceptions.[14] The framework aims to create national uniformity rather than leaving the five-year rule vulnerable to case-by-case antitrust challenges.[15] This directly targets the heart of the Pavia-style disputes.[16] Instead of litigating varying antitrust principles or whether a particular eligibility dispute was handled by the NCAA in good faith, the Act supplies a statutory baseline. Associations retain authority to enforce these standards but the rules themselves gain the stability that Alston’s antitrust scrutiny undermined.
Limited Antitrust Exemption and Preemption
Perhaps the most consequential interaction with the current litigation crisis is the Act’s grant of limited antitrust immunity. The NCAA and involved institutions receive protection when adopting and enforcing rules on eligibility, transfers, compensation, recruiting, and related matters included in the statute.[17] This a shield that would prevent the kind of serial challenges that produced more than thirty eligibility lawsuits in a short span and dozens more after the Pavia injunction.[18] Equally important is preemption. The Act establishes a uniform federal framework for NIL, transfers, and eligibility which preempts conflicting state laws on those subjects while preserving traditional state claims in tort, contract, civil rights, and consumer protection. The Aguilar case, brought under Tennessee’s Trade Practices Act, and similar state-court experiments would face significant hurdles.[19] Forum-shopping across state and federal courts becomes far less viable when the governing standards are national, and the antitrust avenue is narrowed for covered rules.
Transfer Rules and Practical Stability
The Act also imposes structured transfer limits; one free transfer without loss of eligibility for undergraduates with subsequent transfers generally requiring a year of sitting out (subject to exceptions for sport discontinuation, head-coach departure, certain misconduct, or graduate study).[20] Combined with the five-year window, this aims to curb the roster churn that has coincided with eligibility litigation and the explosion of transfer-portal activity.[21] Clarity here reduces the incentive for last-minute lawsuits timed around seasons or professional deadlines.
Limits and Remaining Questions
The legislation is not a complete solution. It remains neutral on whether athletes are employees, leaving collective-bargaining questions for future resolution.[22] Medical-hardship and other waiver processes will still require the NCAA’s showing of fair administration. Further, pure contract claims alleging breach of existing NCAA bylaws or institutional agreements may survive preemption in some form, as seen in the Chambliss theory.[23] Implementation details, like how junior-college or prior collegiate experience interacts with the new five-year clock, will matter.
The Alston decision ushered in an unsustainable system in which eligibility turned on which plaintiffs present the most persuasive legal argument or select the most favorable forum for litigation in a time-pressurized environment. The Act responds by taking the policy questions that Alston left to the political process and answering them with national rules, preemption of conflicting state regimes, and targeted antitrust protection for enforcement of those rules. The Act’s core contribution is replacing patchwork judicial outcomes with predictable standards, so that every collegiate athlete is governed by the same rules rather than the accidents of venue, timing, and state law.
Where Alston told the courts to stay in their lane, the Act attempts to give college sports a clear road map. If enacted, the statute would substantially reduce the litigation lottery that has defined recent eligibility disputes and restore a measure of the competitive equity and planning certainty that the current fragmented system has eroded.
About the Author
Nick Johnston is a J.D. candidate at Widener University Delaware Law School, Class of 2027. He currently serves as the senior-staff editor for the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. In 2024, he graduated cum laude in Government from Franklin & Marshall College. There, he participated on the football team and served on the student athletic leadership counsel. This article addresses expands on the author’s previous article, titled “Judicial Whack-a-Mole: The NCAA’s Eligibility Problem.” The article can be found here. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
[1] Dan Murphy, What is the Protect College Sports Act? What would the bill do?, ESPN (Sep. 28, 2026), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/50001346/protect-college-sports-act-truths-myths-congress (quoting Sen. Maria Cantwell).
[2] Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 107 (2021) (“The national debate about amateurism in college sports is important. But our task as appellate judges is not to resolve it. Nor could we. Our task is simply to review the district court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.).
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] See, e.g., Pavia v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527, 533 (M.D. Tenn. 2024); Chambliss v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 2026-AC-00129 (Miss. Mar. 27, 2026); Bouchard et al., Recent NCAA Eligibility Rulings Highlight Expanding Judicial Role in College Athletics Governance, Morgan Lewis (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/03/recent-ncaa-eligibility-rulings-highlight-expanding-judicial-role-in-college-athletics-governance.
[6] Nick Johnston, Judicial Whack-a-Mole: The NCAA’s Eligibility Problem, Del. J. Corp. L. Blogs (Mar. 24, 2026), https://djclblogs.org/2026/03/24/judicial-whack-a-mole-the-ncaas-eligibility-problem/.
[7] Id.
[8] Id; see also Chambliss, No. 2026-AC-00129 (Miss. Mar. 27, 2026).
[9] Id.
[10] Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., Senate Passes Protect College Sports Act 77-22 (Sep. 29, 2026), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/press/dem/release/senate-passes-protect-college-sports-act-77-22/; see also Protect College Sports Act of 2026, S. 4668, 119th Cong. (2026).
[11] Protect College Sports Act, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/protect-college-sports-act/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2026).
[12] Protect College Sports Act Section-by-Section Summary, § 113, U.S. S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp. (2026), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Protect-College-Sports-Act-Section-by-Section.pdf [hereinafter PCSA Section-by-Section Summary].
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Jason J. Montgomery, TaRonda Randall & Kristina Minor, Executive Summary: Protect College Sports Act of 2026, Husch Blackwell: Insights (May 29, 2026), https://www.huschblackwell.com/newsandinsights/executive-summary-protect-college-sports-act-of-2026.
[16] See Pavia v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 5.
[17] PCSA Section-by-Section Summary, supra note 12, § 118.
[18] Amanda Christovich, NCAA’s Recent Wins May Not Be Enough to Stop Flood of Eligibility Lawsuit, Front Office Sports, (Aug. 11, 2025, 4:44PM), https://frontofficesports.com/ncaas-recent-wins-may-not-be-enough-to-stop-flood-of-eligibility-lawsuits/#:~:text=Since%202024%2C%20the%20NCAA%20has,filings%20coming%20just%20last%20week.
[19] See Questions and Answers About Trinidad Chambliss’, Joey Aguilar’s Eligibility Cases, The Athletic (Feb. 14, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7045406/2026/02/14/trinidad-chambliss-ole-miss-eligibility-joey-aguilar-tennessee/.
[20] PCSA Section-by-Section Summary, supra note 12, § 112.
[21] Id; see also Transfer Portal Data: Division 1 Student- Athlete Transfer Trends, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2022/4/25/transfer-portal-data-division-i-student-athlete-transfer-trends.aspx
[22] PCSA Section-by-Section Summary, supra note 12; see also Mechele Dickerson, Rights, Risks, and Student-Athlete Employment, 136 Yale L.J. F. (Oct. 12, 2026), https://yalelawjournal.org/essay/rights-risks-and-student-athlete-employment.
[23] See Gray Hardison, A Deep Dive into Trinidad Chambliss Versus the NCAA, Red Cup Rebellion (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.redcuprebellion.com/ole-miss-rebels-football/40401/trinidad chambliss-eligibility-lawsuit-suit-case-petition-ncaa-appeal-denied-ole-miss-tom-mars-william-liston-mississippi.

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