By: Mark Calhoun

I. INTRODUCTION
A three-time Super Bowl champion, eight-time Pro Bowler, NFL’s all-time leading rusher, Hall of Fame superstar, and Dallas Cowboys legend Emmitt Smith faces a new showdown in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The “Cowboy” and his corporate partners are being sued by a tribally owned investment entity over an alleged $2.5 million solar venture deal gone wrong.
On August 31, 2026, Kituwah Energy Project #2, LLC (“Kituwah”), an investment entity owned by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, filed a direct and derivative complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The lawsuit names Pro Football Hall of Famer Emmitt Smith, his business associate David Mosley, their firm 4 13 Solutions Inc., investment entity Wilson Holdings, and Darrel Wilson as defendants.[1] The action stems from a $2.5 million credit extended by Kituwah in September 2023 to fund the pre-development phase of “Project Exodus,” a proposed utility-scale solar facility in Caldwell County, Texas.[2]
Beyond the public profile of the principal defendants, the litigation highlights fundamental principles of Delaware equity jurisprudence. Specifically, the case depicts the pleading standards for fraudulent inducement under Court of Chancery Rule 9(b) and the fiduciary obligations owed by joint venture managers under Delaware law.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROJECT EXODUS
Following his fifteen-season NFL career, Emmitt Smith established himself as chairman of 4 13 Solutions Inc., partnering with David Mosley to pursue commercial real estate and renewable energy projects.[3] In 2023, Smith and Mosley pitched Project Exodus to Kituwah, projecting first-year operating income near $14 million and completion by late 2024.[4] Crucial to the proposal was Kituwah’s tribal status, which offered and allowed favorable access to federal energy credits and loan programs.[5] In September 2023, the parties formed a joint venture entity, Jabez 4 10, LLC, managed by Smith and Mosley. Kituwah issued a $2.5 million secured promissory note at 12% interest, maturing on February 1, 2024, to acquire land rights from Genesis Consolidated Industries.[6]
The core controversy concerns the disposition of the loan proceeds. According to Kituwah’s complaint, 4 13 Solutions failed to acquire land rights or make substantive progress on the solar site.[7] Instead, Kituwah alleges the $2.5 million was transferred directly to Wilson Holdings to settle prior debts, violating a side agreement that conditioned payments to Wilson Holdings on securing permanent project financing. The promissory note later matured, without repayment.[8] Formal demand letters sent in late 2024 and forbearance proposals in May 2025 went unfulfilled.[9] By August 2026, accrued interest pushed total claimed damages to approximately $3.1 million.[10]
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CHANCERY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Fraudulent Inducement Pleading Thresholds
Under Delaware law, a claim of fraud requires: (1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance. [11]
Fraud does not always have to come from an affirmative, deliberate act. The Delaware Court of Chancery has recognized that fraud does not only consist of “overt misrepresentations” but may also occur through “deliberate concealment of material facts, or by silence in the face of a duty to speak.”[12] Moreover, given Delaware’s strong public policy against intentional fraud, a knowingly false contractual representation can form the basis for a fraud claim, regardless of the extent to which the agreement purports to disclaim or eliminate tort remedies.[13]
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 9(b) places a higher pleading standard for claims of fraud, as opposed to other conditions of the mind. The Rule requires that averments of fraud must be stated with “particularity,” unlike malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind, which may be stated generally.[14] To satisfy Rule 9(b), Kituwah must plead specific facts showing defendants lacked intent to perform when promises were executed, distinguishing actionable fraud from ordinary breach.
Consider Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Capital Corp., where the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the plaintiff satisfied Rule 9(b) by pleading specific facts showing that a party made contractual commitments while harboring a secret, contemporaneous intent not to carry them out.[15] The court explained that while statements of future performance are generally non-actionable, alleging specific contemporaneous acts, such as using loan proceeds for unauthorized, preexisting obligations instead of project performance, supports a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent at inception. Unlike in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., where the court dismissed a fraudulent inducement claim for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b) because the plaintiff made conclusory assertions that the defendant never intended to comply with the contract.[16] The court emphasized that a plaintiff cannot “bootstrap” a breach of contract claim into a fraud claim simply by appending the phrase “fraudulently induced”.[17] Without specific factual allegations establishing the defendant’s state of mind at the time of contracting, unfulfilled contractual promises remain merely a breach of contract, rather than an actionable claim of fraud.
For Kituwah to survive a dismissal under this framework, they cannot rely on Smith’s default alone. Kituwah must plead specific facts to satisfy Rule 9(b) to establish that Smith and his associates lacked intent to perform when the promissory note was executed.
B. Fiduciary Obligations in Joint Ventures
A central pillar of the plaintiff’s complaint is the assertion that Smith and Mosley breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith as managers of the joint venture entity, Jabez 4 10, LLC. Under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, unless an operating agreement explicitly modifies or eliminates fiduciary duties pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c), managers of a Delaware LLC owe default fiduciary duties analogous to those owed by directors of a Delaware corporation.[18] Managing partners owe unyielding fiduciary duties of loyalty and care under Delaware corporate principles. Diverting dedicated venture capital to extinguish external obligations represents a classic breach of loyalty, exposing managers to direct individual liability.
Nearly a century ago, the Delaware Supreme Court established in Guth v. Loft, Inc. that the fiduciary duty of loyalty demands that corporate managers refrain from taking advantage of their position to serve personal or external interests at the expense of the entity.[19] In Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, Vice Chancellor Laster clarified that Delaware LLC default rules presume traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care remain fully applicable to managing members and officers unless expressly disclaimed in clear and unambiguous contract language.[20]
Applying these general standards to the allegations in Kituwah, the diversion of loan capital designated for land acquisition toward extinguishing preexisting liabilities owed to Wilson Holdings presents a textbook breach of the duty of loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that self-dealing occurs when a fiduciary uses entity assets to secure a direct personal or secondary corporate benefit not shared proportionally by all equity holders.[21] Furthermore, as Chief Justice Strine emphasized in In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, individuals who control a corporate general partner or managing entity owe fiduciary duties directly to the underlying entity and its investors when exercising control over entity property.[22]
Consequently, even if 4 13 Solutions Inc. served as the formal managing vehicle of Jabez 4 10, LLC, Smith and Mosley, as controlling principals, remain individually exposed to fiduciary liability under the In re USACafes doctrine if the court determines they personally directed the misappropriation of project funds to clear independent liabilities.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Kituwah Energy Project #2 v. Smith illustrates the legal risks inherent in joint venture capital allocations and stands at a high-profile intersection of celebrity-backed business ventures, sovereign tribal capital, and foundational principles of Delaware equity jurisprudence. While the dispute between an NFL Hall of Famer and a tribally owned investment firm captures public attention, the Court of Chancery’s resolution will depend entirely on established legal standards. To sustain its fraud claims under Chancery Rule 9(b), Kituwah must plead specific facts proving that Smith and his associates harbored a secret, contemporaneous intent not to perform when executing the transaction rather than merely falling victim to an unfortuitous business deal. Concurrently, if the evidence demonstrates that the Defendants redirected special-purpose joint venture capital to settle unrelated liabilities, such conduct constitutes a textbook breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty under Delaware statutory and case law. As the litigation unfolds, the case serves as an instructive study in joint venture governance, reaffirming the delicate balance in Delaware law between permitting commercial risk-taking and enforcing strict equitable accountability when fiduciaries handle other people’s money.
About the Author
Mark is a third-year regular division J.D. candidate at Delaware Law School. He serves as an Articles Editor for the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. He is also a member of the Transactional Law Honor Society and the Leslie A. Johnson Moot Court Honor Society, where he was a recipient of the Best Appellate Brief award. Mark also served as a Property Law Teaching Assistant to Professor Claire Osborn-Wright, a Criminal Law Teaching Assistant to Professor Kerr, a Research Assistant to Professor Stephen Friedman, an Academic Success Fellow, and a Student Ambassador for the Office of Admissions. For the past two summers, Mark interned for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General. After graduation, Mark plans to clerk for the Honorable Lisa Puglisi with the New Jersey Courts, Appellate Division.
[1] See Kituwah Energy Project #2 LLC v. Smith, No. 2026-1135, 2026 WL 2585457, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2026); see also Cherokee-Owned Company Sues NFL Hall of Famer Over $2.5M Solar Loan, Tribal Bus. News, (Sep. 1, 2026), https://tribalbusinessnews.com/sections/policy-and-law/15753-cherokee-owned-company-sues-nfl-hall-of-famer-over-2-5m-solar-loan.
[2] Jackson Healy, Tribal Group Sues NFL Legend Over Multimillion-Dollar Fraud Scheme, Courthouse News Serv. (Aug. 31, 2026), https://www.courthousenews.com/tribal-group-sues-nfl-legend-over-multimillion-dollar-fraud-scheme/.
[3] Emmitt Smith Accused of Cheating Solar Investor Out of $2.5M, Reuters (Sep. 2, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/sports/emmitt-smith-accused-cheating-solar-investor-out-25m–flm-2026-09-02/; Emmitt Smith Class of 2010 Profile, Pro Football Hall of Fame, https://www.profootballhof.com/players/emmitt-smith (last visited Oct. 15, 2026).
[4] Milos Komnenovic, Emmitt Smith’s Solar Venture Projected $13.8 Million in First-Year Income. An Investor Says Its $2.5 Million Was Diverted, Yahoo Sports (Sep. 3, 2026), https://sports.yahoo.com/articles/emmitt-smith-solar-venture-projected-140110772.html.
[5] See Cherokee-Owned Company Sues NFL Hall of Famer Over $2.5M Solar Loan, supra note 1; See also 26 U.S.C. § 6417 (Elective Payment of Applicable Credits, IRS Direct Pay provision for tribal governments); 26 U.S.C. § 48, (e) (Energy Credit & Low-Income Communities / Indian Land Bonus Credit Program); 25 U.S.C. § 3501 (Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination)).
[6] Nicole Banas, NFL star Smith hit with fraud suit over $2.5 million solar joint venture, Westlaw Corporate Governance Daily Briefing (Sep. 03, 2026); Jarek Rutz, NFL Legend Emmitt Smith, Partners Sued Over Solar Venture, Law360 (Aug. 31, 2026), https://www.law360.com/articles/2519797/nfl-legend-emmitt-smith-partners-sued-over-solar-venture; Matt Mitchell, Cherokee-Owned Firm Sues Emmitt Smith Over $2.5M Texas Solar Loan Gone Missing, Hoodline (Sep. 2, 2026), https://hoodline.com/2026/09/cherokee-owned-firm-sues-emmitt-smith-over-2-5m-texas-solar-loan-gone-missing/.
[7] See Mitchell, supra note 6.
[8] Verified Direct and Derivative Compl., KITUWAHENERGY PROJECT #2, LLC v. Emmitt Smith, No. 2026-1135, 2026 WL 2613282, ¶ 22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2026) (“Kituwah’s loan came due on February 1, 2024. It was not repaid. Without access to Jabez’s account, Kituwah did not and could not know what happened to the loan proceeds other than what had been represented by 41 3 Solutions.”).
[9] Id. at ¶¶ 89, 91 (“On November 8, 2024, Kituwah sent letters to GCI and Mosley reserving Kituwah’s rights to pursue remedies for the Note. Kituwah did not receive any payments—or even a substantive response—from either party . . . On May 21, 2025, in continued effort to reach an amicable resolution, Kituwah sent drafts of an Amended and Restated Secured Promissory Note and a Forbearance Agreement and First Amendment to Promissory Note and to GCI Repayment Agreement to Mosley and GCI. Kituwah received no substantive response.”).
[10] Id.
[11] See Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983) (defining common law fraud elements: (1) a false representation of material fact; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of or belief as to the falsity of the representation or the defendant’s reckless indifference to the truth of the representation; (3) the defendant’s intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation; and (5) damages to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance). See also Sehoy Energy LP v. Adriani, No. CV 12387, 2021 WL 2450435, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2021) (citing CSH Theatres, LLC v. Nederlander of San Francisco Assocs., 2015 WL 1839684, at *21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2015), aff’d sub nom. In re Shorenstein Hays-Nederlander Theatres LLC Appeals, 213 A.3d 39 (Del. 2019)).
[12] Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 472 (Del. 1992).
[13] AmeriMark Interactive, LLC v. AmeriMark Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. N21C-12-175, 2022 WL 16642020, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2022) (citing Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 136–37 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
[14] Del. Ch. Ct. R. 9(b) (“Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”); In re P3 Health Grp. Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 2021-0518, 2022 WL 15035833, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2022), as corrected (Oct. 28, 2022); Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1050 (Del. Ch. 2006).
[15] Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Cap. Corp., C.A. No. 3088, 2008 WL 5352063, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2008) (“Winner has alleged with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) a series of fraudulent promises made by Defendants, including facts which support a reasonable inference that they had no intention to fulfill the alleged promises at the time they were made”).
[16] MicroStrategy Inc. v. Acacia Rsch. Corp., C.A. No. 5735-VCP, 2010 WL 5550455, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2010) (“the [c]omplaint failed to allege nonconclusory factual allegations that would provide a basis to pierce ARC’s corporate veil . . . the [c]omplaint fails to allege sufficient facts for the Court to disregard ARC’s corporate form . . . the Complaint merely pleads in a conclusory fashion that DAS is the alter ego of ARC. It does not allege any facts that Delaware courts traditionally rely upon for piercing the corporate veil; it merely pleads that the two corporations took actions that allegedly constitute breaches of contract and fraud without asserting any facts suggesting that such wrongs arose out of a “misuse of the corporate structure.” Thus, [plaintiff] has not adequately pled a claim to pierce ARC’s corporate veil and attribute its actions to its subsidiary, . . . .).
[17] Id. at *17 (“Delaware law holds that a plaintiff ‘cannot ‘bootstrap’ a claim of breach of contract into a claim of fraud merely by alleging that a contracting party never intended to perform its obligations.’ In other words, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for fraud simply by adding the term “fraudulently induced” to a complaint or alleging that the defendant never intended to comply with the agreement at issue at the time the parties entered into it. Indeed, couching an alleged failure to comply with the contract at issue as a failure to disclose an intention to take certain actions arguably inconsistent with that contract is ‘exactly the type of bootstrapping this Court will not entertain.’” (citing Iotex Commc’ns, Inc. v. Defries, 1998 WL 914265, at *4, *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1998); BAE Sys. N. Am. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2004 WL 1739522, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2004))).
[18] See 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(c); see also Auriga Cap. Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that default fiduciary duties apply to Delaware LLC managers unless explicitly eliminated in the operating agreement).
[19] Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (establishing the foundational rule that fiduciaries must refrain from self-dealing and personal gain at entity expense).
[20] Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 660–62 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that default fiduciary duties apply to managing members and officers of Delaware LLCs).
[21] In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 321 (Del. 1993) (defining self-dealing and non-pro-rata extraction of corporate value).
[22] In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 1991) (holding that individuals controlling a managing entity owe fiduciary duties directly to the underlying entity regarding entity assets).

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