By: Warren A. Sikolo

In March of 2022, Los Angeles Clippers Chief Commercial Officer Scott Sonnenberg texted the team’s CFO, Eric Chan, about a pending deal.[2]
“I never wanted this Forum deal. Always knew it was super shady.”[3]
In a separate exchange, he wrote:
“I cannot begin to tell you all the red flags with these deals. Just doing what I’m told at this point.”[4]
That is what an early warning is supposed to look like: a senior officer spotted the risk, called it what it was, and put it in writing. If you designed a compliance program from scratch, this is the moment you would design it for. The Clippers executed the Forum Agreement the following month.[5]
The texts surfaced in Wachtell’s September 2, 2026, report, which followed an investigation triggered by Pablo Torre Finds Out reporting that the Clippers had used a sponsor’s endorsement deal to pay Kawhi Leonard outside his player contract.[6]
And the Clippers present the harder version of the oversight question. The warning did not get lost; it traveled through the CFO and into Ballmer’s personal business office.[7] So: escalate to whom?
I. A Carbon-Offset Agreement, Priced Like an Endorsement Deal
First, the deal Sonnenberg did not want. In September of 2021, Aspiration Partners, a sustainability-services company, and the Clippers went all in on each other: a 23-year, $382.5 million jersey-patch and Intuit Dome sponsorship; a 23-year, $72 million sustainability-services deal; and a $50 million personal investment in Aspiration by Steve Ballmer.[8] The following spring, Aspiration co-founder Joe Sanberg—since convicted of fraud—wanted one more thing: a deal to “zero out” the Forum’s historical carbon emissions.[9]
The negotiation did not start with a carbon calculation. A January 2022 draft term sheet carried the heading “Business Back Opporutnities [sic]” and the notation “[t]o be filled in by Eric Chan ($7M back in business).”[10] Seven million dollars a year also was the cash component of the endorsement deal Aspiration was negotiating with Leonard.[11] Ballmer and Gillian Zucker, the Clippers’ President of Business Operations, later told investigators that a consultant had calculated the Forum project would cost $28 million.[12] Investigators asked the consultant; he said the Clippers had given him a $28 million budget.[13] That was the deal Sonnenberg called “super shady.”[14]
II. What Oversight Law Expects to Happen Next
Delaware’s modern oversight doctrine, built on Caremark and Stone v. Ritter, asks whether fiduciaries made a good-faith effort to surface legally significant risk and respond to what surfaced. Liability requires bad faith, not simply a bad outcome.[15]
At this stage, surfacing was not the problem. The Chief Commercial Officer flagged the risk in real time; he just had more red flags than he could list.[16]
A. The Officers Were All Present
Aspiration was not a one-off. Investigators found the same playbook across four team partners—Aspiration, Boingo Wireless, Daktronics, and Lockton Insurance—and described a “pattern of conduct . . . involving four separate arrangements sharing many common characteristics.”[17]
Daktronics shows the mechanism best. In May 2020, the Clippers told the scoreboard maker it was the preferred vendor for the Intuit Dome but wanted a “spend back”—an arrangement under which Daktronics would direct some business back to the Clippers.[18] Zucker then suggested that the spend back take the form of a Leonard endorsement.[19] A senior Clippers executive specified $3 million per year for two years.[20] When the Clippers later increased their own scoreboard spending, the same executive pressed Daktronics to increase Leonard’s compensation; Daktronics ultimately added $2 million.[21]
The spend back itself was ordinary. What the Clippers turned it into was not: investigators found that the additional $2 million “originated entirely from the Clippers.”[22] Investigators found Zucker and Lawrence Frank, the Clippers’ President of Basketball Operations, “primarily and directly culpable.”[23] Zucker was the point person on all four deals and later “made misleading and false statements to investigators” about the Clippers’ role.[24]
So much for the gatekeeper model. The senior officer at the center of the business relationships was, according to Wachtell, also a principal participant—and later a source of false information to the people sent to examine the conduct.[25]
By late March 2022, the Forum deal was stalling. In a message to the business agent working on Leonard’s endorsement, Sanberg recounted what he had told Sonnenberg:[26]
“I told Scott Sonnenberg that I’ll need to break the deal with Kawhi and explain why, which is that we got f**ked by the Clippers. Scott asked me not to do that. But if this isn’t signed by tomorrow, there will be no choice but to do that. Kawhi deal is not happening without this Forum deal.”[27]
In the same message chain, Sanberg wrote:
“Spoke again just now with Alex [Winsberg, then the Clippers’ General Counsel] and Eric [Chan] and they have no solution.”[28]
On Sanberg’s account, the concern had reached the CFO and General Counsel. The report places both in the conversation but does not attribute to either a decision to stop the deal. Sonnenberg is murkier: he recorded the red flags, but Sanberg’s contemporaneous account also says Sonnenberg asked him not to tell Leonard why the deal might collapse.[29]
B. Officers Are Part of the Architecture
Oversight duties do not stop at the boardroom door. In In re McDonald’s Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster held that “corporate officers owe a duty of oversight” and that, within an officer’s remit, the duty includes an obligation to “address and report upward about red flags.”[30]
One caveat matters. Five weeks later, the same court dismissed the parallel director oversight claims because the board had responded to the red flags and the complaint did not support an inference that the directors “acted in bad faith in response to those red flags.”[31] The officer-duty holding remains a Court of Chancery holding.
McDonald’s makes “upward” the interesting word: the opinion expressly speaks of an officer’s duty to “report upward about red flags.”[32] Reporting up, however, works as a control only if someone receiving the report is willing and able to act. Hold that thought.
C. The Red Flag Reaches the Owner
On March 30, 2022, Chan escalated—to Brandt Vaughan, then Chief Investment Officer of Ballmer’s personal business office:[33]
“[Sanberg’s] last comment was if we don’t sign this deal he will sue Steve, the Clippers, and burn everything down. But let’s chat when you can. He will also call Kawhi and tell them how the Clippers screwed everything.”[34]
The next day, Chan double-checked:
“Steve knows that when this deal blows up, Joe is calling Kawhi and telling him his $12M deal is no longer because of Clippers management, right? I think so, but just double checking.”[35]
He did. Investigators found that Ballmer knew Sanberg had threatened to kill the Leonard deal if the Forum Agreement was not executed, and that Ballmer “personally approved the Clippers’ execution of the Forum Agreement in April 2022”—conduct Wachtell concluded “constitutes an act of facilitation that violates the NBA’s circumvention rules.”[36]
So the title needs an honest answer. The Clippers did not run out of “up.” The information reached the owner. According to Wachtell, the harder problem is that Ballmer was also implicated in the conduct.[37] That sharpens the governance question rather than dissolving it. Escalation solves an information problem; it does not, by itself, restrain the person with final authority when that person is implicated in what is being reported.
D. What Delaware Does When the Top Participates
Delaware has a vocabulary for that, too. In In re Fox Corp. Derivative Litigation, stockholders alleged that Fox’s leadership, including Rupert and Lachlan Murdoch, decided in bad faith to have Fox News defame two voting-machine companies. Vice Chancellor Laster put the principle plainly:[38]
“Delaware law gives its corporations expansive freedom to pursue any lawful business in pursuit of profit. But Delaware law does not permit a corporation to operate unlawfully. Not only that, but corporate fiduciaries breach their duty of loyalty when they decide to violate the law.”[39]
The holding is narrower than the principle. The court held only that the stockholders could proceed derivatively without first demanding that the board sue because the complaint raised sufficient doubt about at least four of the eight directors’ ability to consider the claims impartially; it did not decide ultimate liability.[40]
The lesson is about register. Once the person receiving the warning is alleged to have knowingly participated, the analysis can move beyond deficient oversight and into affirmative-disloyalty territory.[41] Wachtell’s findings describe both registers: Ballmer’s facilitation of the Forum Agreement and his failure to “create conditions under which his organization abided by the NBA’s circumvention rules.”
One limit, stated plainly: Fox concerned alleged violations of law. Wachtell applied private NBA rules contained in the CBA, not positive law.[42] This Article therefore uses Fox as a structural comparison, not as a claim that the Clippers facts establish a Delaware loyalty breach.
III. Nobody Was Confused About the Rule
No obscure-technicality defense fits this record. Wachtell reports that NBA rules prohibit teams from recommending, initiating, facilitating, inducing, or assisting a player’s off-court business relationships.[43] The league republished the rule annually, including in guides sent directly to owners, and gave this example: “A team representative initiates or facilitates an endorsement relationship between a team sponsor and one of the team’s players.”[44] The Clippers had already been fined $250,000 for comparable conduct in 2015.[45] Ballmer, Zucker, and Frank also attended league circumvention training in December 2019 and later acknowledged that they understood the rules.[46] The league separately required teams to report improper solicitations made on a player’s behalf, yet the investigative record contains no evidence that the Clippers reported Robertson’s repeated demands.[47]
A reporting obligation is only as useful as the willingness of those with the relevant information to cause a report to be made. Here, satisfying the team’s obligation depended on people who knew about Robertson’s solicitations—including Ballmer, Zucker, and Frank—and the report found no evidence that the team made the required report.[48]
IV. Escalate to Whom?
The usual moral of stories like this is “better information flow.” Not here. Some of the most important information was written down, timestamped, and preserved well enough for investigators to reconstruct years later.[49] What oversight doctrine cannot guarantee is an independent check once the final decisionmaker is implicated. A duty to report upward is only as good as the person or body capable of acting on the report.
The Clippers had a Chief Commercial Officer who saw the red flags, a CFO who understood the linkage, and, on Sanberg’s account, a General Counsel in the loop. The information moved. What the record does not show is anyone who converted that knowledge into a check on the people making the call.[50]
Then the bill came. The NBA took five first-round picks and $30 million, suspended Ballmer for one year, Zucker for one year without pay, and Frank for six months without pay, and placed the franchise under five years of league monitoring.[51]
The team first “vehemently reject[ed]” the findings as the product of a “heavily biased investigation.”[52] Eleven days later, Ballmer said the team had paid the fine and would comply with the penalties while disagreements remained: “Team owners should support, not distract.”[53]
Failure to supervise. A permitted culture. Failure to create conditions of compliance. Prior notice.[54] Those phrases could have come from a Delaware oversight opinion. They came from NBA-retained outside investigators, and the sanctions came from the league.[55]
Call it management override or tone at the top. Delaware asks a narrower, harder question: when does that organizational failure become a fiduciary one? Here, the public answer did not come from a Delaware court. It came from the league.
That answers the title, at least for the Clippers. There was somewhere to escalate: the league required the team to report improper solicitations. But Ballmer, Zucker, and Frank knew about Robertson’s demands, and Wachtell found no evidence that the Clippers made the required report.[56] The escalation that ultimately triggered the investigation went around them—an anonymous former Aspiration employee, a podcast, then the league office.[57] When the top is part of the problem, escalation may have to leave the building. Here it did. It just took more than three years and a microphone.[58]
[1] The LA Clippers LLC is a Delaware limited liability company, not a Delaware corporation. See Founding Sponsorship Agreement 1, Ex. 10.39 to InterPrivate III Fin. Partners Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) (Feb. 15, 2022). Delaware LLC members may sue derivatively, see Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, §§ 18-1001, 18-1003, but an LLC agreement may expand, restrict, or eliminate fiduciary duties, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). Because the Clippers’ operating agreement is not public, this Article uses Delaware oversight doctrine as an analytical lens; it does not assert that Caremark governs the team.
[2] Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Summary Report of Independent Investigators Concerning the LA Clippers and Kawhi Leonard 28 (Sep. 2, 2026) [hereinafter Wachtell Report]. The NBA retained Wachtell to investigate the allegations. Id. at 1.
[3] Id. at 28.
[4] Id. at 28 (describing the message only as part of “another text exchange”).
[5] Id. at 31.
[6] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 1.
[7] Id. at 30–31.
[8] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 22.
[9] Id. at 5, 28.
[10] Id. at 28–29.
[11] Id. at 29.
[12] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 29.
[13] Id. at 29–30.
[14] Id. at 28.
[15] In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
[16] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 28.
[17] Id. at 1–2.
[18] Id. at 19.
[19] Id. at 19.
[20] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 20.
[21] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 20–21.
[22] Id. at 19–21.
[23] Id. at 2.
[24] Id. at 34.
[25] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 34.
[26] Id. at 30.
[27] Id. at 30.
[28] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 30.
[29] Id. at 28, 30.
[30] In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 289 A.3d 343, 349–50 (Del. Ch. 2023).
[31] In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 291 A.3d 652, 674 (Del. Ch. 2023).
[32] McDonald’s, 289 A.3d at 350.
[33] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 31.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 31, 34.
[38] In re Fox Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2023-0418-JTL, mem. op. at 2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2024).
[39] Id. at 2.
[40] Id. at 2–4.
[41] Id. at 2; Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 2, 31, 34.
[42] Fox, C.A. No. 2023-0418-JTL, mem. op. at 2; Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 7.
[43] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 7–8.
[44] Id. at 8.
[45] Id. at 9.
[46] Id. at 10.
[47] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 10, 13, 33.
[48] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 13, 33–34.
[49] Id. at 28, 30–31.
[50] Id.
[51] NBA Announces Penalties and Findings Arising from Investigation of LA Clippers and Kawhi Leonard, NBA: Top Stories (Sep. 2, 2026), https://www.nba.com/news/nba-investigation-findings-la-clippers.
[52] Steve Henson & Mirjam Swanson, NBA Hammers Clippers, Steve Ballmer and Kawhi Leonard Following Investigation, L.A. Times (Sep. 2, 2026), https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2026-09-02/nba-investigation-findings-clippers-steve-ballmer-kawhi-leonard-aspiration-salary-cap-circumvention.
[53] Statement from Clippers Governor Steve Ballmer, NBA (Sep. 14, 2026), https://www.nba.com/news/statement-from-clippers-governor-steve-ballmer.
[54] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 2, 34.
[55] Id. at 1; NBA Announces Penalties and Findings Arising from Investigation of LA Clippers and Kawhi Leonard, NBA: Top Stories (Sep. 2, 2026), https://www.nba.com/news/nba-investigation-findings-la-clippers.
[56] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 10, 13, 33–34.
[57] Id. at 1.
[58] Wachtell Report, supra note 2, at 1, 28.

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